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I.  INTRODUCTION 
Bilateral investment treaties (hereinafter "BIT") have been created with the goal 
of promoting economic prosperity through the facilitation of international investment 
flows.1  The idea was to facilitate these investment flows by the opening up of secure 
channels for foreign direct investment (hereinafter "FDI"),2 stabilizing the 
investment climate,3 granting protective investment guarantees,4 and providing 
neutral dispute mechanisms for "injured" investors.5  
                                                                 
 1 Kenneth J. Vandevelde, The Economics of Bilateral Investment Treaties, 41 HARV. 
INT’L L.J. 469, 471 (2000). 
 2 Id. 
 3 Andrea K. Bjorklund, Introduction, 12 U.C. DAVIS J. INT’L L. & POL’Y 1, 2 (2005). 
 4 Susan D. Franck, The Nature and Enforcement of Investor Rights Under Investment 
Treaties: Do Investment Treaties Have a Bright Future, 12 U.C. DAVIS J. INT'L L. & POL'Y 47, 
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Since their inception in 1959,6 BITs have experienced a "massive and sudden 
proliferation . . . which has been . . . a 'remarkable' event in international law[,]"7 and 
as of the end of 2008, there were over 2,600 BITs in circulation.8  Many of these 
treaties have been signed between developed countries and developing countries for 
the purpose of encouraging FDI capital to come into the developing countries and 
stimulate their markets, economies, and infrastructures.9  Unfortunately, while this 
seems to be plausible and desirable in theory, the reality is that these BITs have 
effectively taken control of the developing countries' markets, resources, and capital 
and provided little to no benefit in return.10  Fortunately, current global factors are 
providing a prime opportunity for developing countries to re-shape their current BITs 
through slight de-liberalization in order to help facilitate the desired FDI inflow 
while ensuring that the investments do in fact improve their economies.   
The following paper will attempt to show that a pseudo-interventionist approach 
to BIT provisions coupled with the promotion of the recent changes to the alternative 
dispute resolution (hereinafter "ADR") mechanisms already in place can help 
developing countries entice FDI while actually promoting domestic markets and 
improving domestic economies.  Furthermore, this paper will explain how the 
present economic situation can help encourage these de-liberalized actions and 
defeat the problem of collective action, by providing an ideal atmosphere for 
developing countries to work together without the fear of discouraging desired FDI.  
II.  AN OVERVIEW OF BITS 
"One of the most remarkable phenomena in international law during the past 
fifteen years has been the extraordinary increase in the number of agreements 
concluded relating to the protection or liberalization of foreign investment."11   
BIT agreements got their start during the Post-Colonial Era when decolonization 
was occurring after World War II and many newly independent and economically 
                                                          
48 (2005) ("These [BITs] act like economic bills of rights, which grant foreign investors 
substantive protections and procedural rights to facilitate investment."). 
 5 Tom Ginsburg, International Substitutes for Domestic Institutions: Bilateral Investment 
Treaties and Governance, 25 INT’L REV. L. & ECON. 107, 108 (2005). 
 6 Kenneth J. Vandevelde, A Brief History of International Investment Agreements, 12 
U.C. DAVIS J. INT'L L. & POL'Y 157, 169 (2005). 
 7 Jason Webb Yackee, Are BITs Such a Bright Idea? Exploring the Ideational Basis of 
Investment Treaty Enthusiasm, 12 U.C. DAVIS J. INT'L L. & POL'Y 195, 195 (2005). 
 8 Luke E. Peterson, Human Rights and Bilateral Investment Treaties: Mapping the Role 
of Human Rights Law within Investor-State Arbitration, INVESTING IN HUMAN RIGHTS v. 3 pp. 
11 (Rights & Democracy 2008), available at http://www.dd-rd.ca/site/_PDF/publications/ 
globalization/HIRA-volume3-ENG.pdf. 
 9 Ginsburg, supra note 5, at 108; Franck, supra note 4, at 48-49, 52-53. 
10 See Vandevelde, supra note 1, at 484, 490 ("BITs liberalize capital movements in only 
one direction—outward"); BITs, BILATERALS.ORG, http://www.bilaterals.org/rebrique-
print.php3?id_rubriquie=29 (last visited Apr. 2, 2011) (BITs constrain governments from 
being able to regulate investment and general economic functions). 
11 Vandevelde, supra note 6, at 157. 
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undeveloped countries were formed.12  At that time the General Agreement on 
Tariffs and Trade (GATT) had established itself as the principle forum for regulating 
and protecting international trade, but there was no equal organization for 
investments.13  Furthermore, in the 1970s the U.N. General Assembly declared that 
each state has the right to expropriate foreign property.14  Therefore, with the 
unpredictability of newly formed economies, no protective organization for 
investments and the right to expropriate developed countries sought to establish a 
way to protect their investors and investments.  It was BITs that offered potentially 
the most effective means for achieving this protection.15  
The first BIT was concluded between Germany and Pakistan in 1959, and within 
seven years, France, Switzerland, the Netherlands, Italy, Belgium-Luxembourg, 
Sweden, Denmark, and Norway had established BIT programs of their own.16  Ten 
years later, the United Kingdom, Austria, Japan, and the United States followed 
suit.17  However, these BITs were signed fairly irregularly18 until the Global Era of 
1980, where there was "an explosion in the number of BITs [signed]."19  This is 
partially due to the debt crisis in 1980, where developing countries needed capital 
finance development and did not have much alternative other than to seek out BITs 
with developed countries.20  By the 1990s, BIT signings became the "thing to do" for 
developing countries, with over 1,000 being signed;21 by the middle of 2008, an 
estimated 2,600 BITs were in circulation.22 
                                                                 
12 Id. at 166. 
13 Id. at 162. 
14 Id. at 168. 
15 Id. at 168-69. 
16 Vandevelde, supra note 6, at 169.  The BIT programs started in France in 1960, 
Switzerland in 1961, the Netherlands in 1963, Italy and Belgium-Luxembourg in 1964, 
Sweden and Denmark in 1965, and Norway in 1966. Id. 
17 Id. at 170.  The BIT programs started in the United Kingdom in 1975, Austria in 1976, 
Japan in 1977, and the United States in 1977. Id. 
18 The irregularity was due in part by the developing countries' fear of western exploitation 
and the soviet bloc's ideals that economic development can be best achieved through extensive 
state regulation. Id. at 166-67. 
19 Id. at 177.  211 BITs were signed during the 1980s as opposed to 86 in the 1970s. 
Antonio R. Parra, ICSID and the Rise of Bilateral Investment Treaties: Will ICSID be the 
Leading Arbitration Institution in the Early 21st Century?, 94 AM. SOC’Y INT’L PROC. 41, 42 
(2000). 
20 Vandevelde, supra note 6, at 177-78.  By signing these BITs, it showed foreign 
investors that the signatory country had a desire to provide a secure, liberal environment for 
investment. Id. at 179. 
21 Ginsburg, supra note 5, at 117; Parra, supra note 19 (the estimate in number is 
anywhere between 960 and 1,300 BITs forming between 1990 and 1998).  By the mid-1990s, 
BITs were being signed at a “rate of one every other day.” Vandevelde, supra note 1, at 469. 
22 Peterson, supra note 8, at 11.  Partially due to the fact that by the 1980's most countries 
were following the United State's Model BIT. Ginsburg, supra note 5, at 111. 
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Although there are over 2,600 different BITs currently in force, most of them are 
surprisingly uniform in their provisions and protections.23  Some of the basic 
protections these treaties provide investors are: compensation for expropriation; 
freedom from unreasonable or discriminatory measures; national treatment; 
assurances of fair and equitable treatment of investment; promises that investments 
will receive full protection and security that is no less favorable than that accorded 
under international law; the sovereign's commitment to honor and uphold its 
obligations under the treaty;24 free capital repatriation; and most favored nation 
requirements.25  
Furthermore, almost all of these treaties provide ADR provisions that allow states 
to bring claims regarding the interpretation or application of a treaty provision, as 
well as allow investors to bring claims against states for treaty violations, often 
referred to as Investor-State Arbitration.26  These ADR methods are often 
international arbitration proceedings that are governed mostly by either the 
International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes (ICSID), United Nations 
Center for International Trade Law (UNCITRAL), or the International Court of 
Commerce (ICC).27  However, the ICSID is the most widely used arbitration 
mechanism in investment treaty enforcement with over 30% of current BITs 
providing for its use.28  
III.  HOW BITS HARM DEVELOPING COUNTRIES' ECONOMIES 
"Marxist economists have . . . characterized foreign investment as the 
recolonization of host states."29  The reason for this characterization is that BITs 
provide foreign control over domestic economies by redistributing domestic wealth 
and power through the transfer of control over local assets to foreign entities.  As 
stated by Kenneth Vandevelde, "control . . . is a key element of the rationale for 
establishing foreign direct investment."30  Furthermore, BITs do not serve their 
                                                                 
23 Vandevelde, supra note 1, at 469. 
24 Franck, supra note 4, at 53.  
25 Ginsburg, supra note 5, at 109; Parra, supra note 19, at 41. 
26 Franck, supra note 4, at 53-54.  These investor-state dispute mechanisms grant private 
investors, corporations, or individuals the right to sue a sovereign state in an international 
tribunal and receive binding awards of compensation from the state. Isabelle Van Damme, 
Eighth Annual WTO Conference: An Overview, 12 J. INT’L ECON. L. 175, 176 (2009). 
27 Franck, supra note 4, at 54.  The ICSID was formulated under the World Bank and it is 
situated at the World Bank headquarters in Washington, D.C. Ronald A. Brand, Convention of 
the Settlement on Investment Disputes between States and Nationals of Other States: 
Introduction & Bibliography, I.E.L. VIII-A (1991).  
28 THE WORLD BANK- THE WORLD BANK GROUP-ICSID, 3 L. of Int'l Trade §79:16 
(Lillian V. Blageff, ed., 2009); Franck, supra note 4, at 56 (stating that the ICSID administers 
the majority of the investment treaty cases).  However, ICSID does not arbitrate itself but 
mostly provides Conciliators and Arbitrators that can be appointed to a case through consent 
of the disputing parties. Brand, supra note 27.   
29 Vandevelde, supra note 1, at 484. 
30 Id. at 476. 
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purpose of facilitating FDI flows to developing countries but only serve the purpose 
of providing high levels of investment protection and liberalization to unstable 
markets.31   
Generally, the control is derived from BITs allowing foreign investors to enter 
into developing countries and purchase various domestic assets, which is basically 
granting control over a domestic resource to a non-domestic entity.32  This is not 
necessarily undesirable because theoretically it can provide a developing country 
with (1) foreign capital, (2) jobs, (3) technology, (4) increased domestic production, 
and (5) more developed domestic markets or market participants/corporations.  
Additionally, provisions requiring ADR allow for a neutral body to settle disputes, 
which ideally would provide for quick and accurate decisions regarding BITs and the 
signatory parties' responsibilities under them.  Unfortunately, this is not what is 
happening. 
First, FDI does not increase domestic capital.  It is argued that FDI will help to 
bring in a flow of foreign currency into the developing economies; however, this is 
often not the case.33  For example, FDIs tend to only acquire existing capital stock, 
thereby merely shifting control over currently existing capital and not bringing in 
any new capital.34  Additionally, they may create a local subsidiary of the parent 
corporation, as opposed to joint ventures with local companies, and therefore, 
finance the investment locally with existing domestic capital.35  Furthermore, this 
establishment of a local subsidiary also helps to bypass trade barriers, transaction 
costs, and import taxes, thus denying funds that would typically contribute to the 
host countries’ liquid assets.36   
Moreover, BITs act as the catalyst to the exodus of "hot money" from the 
developing countries that can leave the country's economy with even less capital then 
it started with.37  This is possible because of the provisions allowing for the free 
repatriation of foreign investments.  Free repatriation allows for investors to quickly 
"take their money and run" at any sign of political, social, or economic distress 
without any monetary ramifications or consequences.38 
Second, BITs do not necessarily promote the increase of domestic jobs and could 
even decrease them.  This is often the case because FDIs tend to bring in highly 
                                                                 
31 See generally id.; Ginsburg, supra note 5, at 118. 
32 Vandevelde, supra note 1, at 484. 
33 Yackee, supra note 7, at 196. 
34 See Vandevelde, supra note 1, at 481. For BITs to have control, investments do not need 
to contribute to capital formation; they may just move the control of assets from domestic 
investors to foreign ones. See id. at 492. 
35 Id. at 481-82. 
36 See generally id. at 474-75. 
37 See Ginsburg, supra note 5, at 112. "BITs only liberalize outward movements in 
capital." See generally Vandevelde, supra note 1, at 489. 
38 See Ginsburg, supra note 5, at 111-112.  This fleeing of "hot money" was partially 
responsible for the Asian economic collapse in the late 90s. Id. 
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trained employees from abroad to fill open positions or use these outside employees 
to replace local management.39 
Third, BITs do not promote or require the transfer of technology to developing 
countries.40  Often, a foreign investor will develop the technology in the home state 
and ship it to a subsidiary that is run almost solely by non-domestic employees.41  
Additionally, FDIs can even help investors to shield technology from developing 
countries because investors can use their own technology without licensing it out to a 
corporation since they can establish a local branch, operated by foreign employees, 
to operate the specific technology.42 
Fourth, BITs do not help to promote increased production, which is vital to the 
development of a stable, self-sufficient economy.43  Productivity is created by 
capital, natural resources, and labor.44  As stated above, BITs do not increase capital 
but rather change the entity in control of it or decrease it through repatriation.45  BITs 
do not increase labor or its productivity because FDIs may just bring in employees 
from abroad.46  Furthermore, BITs do not help increase the return on natural 
resources because they increase the levels of investment protection, which lower the 
price of the natural resources and thus decrease the return on the resources to the 
developing country.47 
Fifth, BITs do not help to develop local markets or market participants.  BITs do 
not ensure that the market they are liberalizing is functioning properly before it 
liberalizes it.  Therefore, it may allow in investments that the market cannot handle, 
thereby preventing any potential development.48  This is because FDI may provide 
for low prices or set specific standards of quality that domestic competitors cannot 
compete with and thus be forced to close, leaving no local competition49 
As for the ADR mechanism, the investor-state arbitration system, provided for 
under most BITS, hinders developing countries because it undermines local 
governance and diverts government funds from the public to cover administrative 
fees, legal fees, and provide for typically large monetary compensations that can and 
have been awarded to investors by the arbitration tribunals.  Investor-state arbitration 
undermines local governance because its unpredictability and inconsistency expose 
developed countries to unknown potential litigation risk every time they attempt to 
                                                                 
39 Vandevelde, supra note 1, at 482. 
40 Id. at 492. 
41 Id. at 482-83. 
42 See id. at 474-75. 
43 See id. at 483.  However, development is still more important than production for 
developing countries. Id. 
44 Vandevelde, supra note 1, at 478-79. 
45 See id. at 481; see also Ginsburg, supra note 5, at 112. 
46 Vandevelde, supra note 1, at 479, 482. 
47 Ginsburg, supra note 5, at 118. 
48 See Vandevelde, supra note 1, at 490. 
49 See id. at 481. 
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exercise their sovereign legislative and regulatory powers.50  Past decisions by 
arbitration tribunals regarding violations of investment treaties have been vastly 
inconsistent, including some situations where different tribunals have come to 
completely different results regarding nearly identical textual treaty rights.51  Such 
inconsistencies inhibit the developing state from making informed decisions about 
regulations and legislations that effect investment treaty provisions because there is 
no consistent, predictable interpretation regarding the scope or application of the BIT 
provisions.52 
This unpredictability and inconsistency stems from the fact that these arbitration 
proceedings were highly secretive, and therefore, one tribunal would not have any 
idea what another tribunal's decision was or the reasoning behind it.53  This prevents 
any legal precedent to form and forces an already ad hoc tribunal to make ad hoc 
decisions without any guidance.54 Furthermore, investor-state arbitration forces 
developing countries to divert funds from use for public benefit to payment of 
administrative fees, legal fees, and dispute settlement awards.55  For starters, 
administrative fees and legal fees on their own can reach into the millions.56  
Additionally, the average claim is for damages in excess of $100 million,57 with 
multiple claims for a violation potentially reaching into the billions.58  For example, 
in Methanex v. U.S., the cost of arbitration was 2 million dollars and the legal fees 
                                                                 
50 Franck, supra note 4, at 57-58.  "Grant Kesler, Metalclad's former CEO, said that 'the 
[arbitration] process [i]s too . . . indeterminate.'"  This was said after the same arbitration 
awarded his company over 16.5 million in compensation. Metalclad Corporation v. United 
Mexican States, ICSID Case No. ARB(AF)/97/1, Award, ¶ 131 (Aug. 30, 2000); Jack J. Coe, 
Jr., Toward a Complementary Use of Conciliation in Investor-State Disputes: A Preliminary 
Sketch, 12 U.C. DAVIS J. INT'L L. & POL'Y 7, 9-10 (2005). 
51 Franck, supra note 4, at 55-56.  For example, Mr. Lauder, a U.S. Citizen, brought a 
claim against the Czech Republic under the U.S./Czech Republic BIT, but he has his 
investment restructured under a Dutch Investment group.  Upon the alleged violation of the 
Czech Republic Mr. Lauder and the Dutch firm each brought a separate claims under the 
applicable BIT.  These identical claims resulted in different conclusion on all but one point. Id. 
at 60-61.  
52 Id. at 51-52.  For example, the terms "investment" and "investor" are not properly 
defined and have often been understood to have broad definitions thereby allowing for a vast 
array of potential claims to be brought against a sovereign. See generally id. at 62. See also 
Brand, supra note 27; Vandevelde, supra note 1, at 491-92.  
53 See Franck, supra note 4, at 73-75. 
54 Coe, supra note 50, at 21-22 (stating that arbitral tribunals are ad hoc adjudicators). 
55 See UNCTAD Reviews Investor-State Dispute Settlement Cases and Draws Implication 
for Developing Countries, UNCTAD (Feb. 5, 2006) available at http://www.unctad.org/ 
Templates/Webflyer.asp?docID=6967&intItemID =4712&lang=1 (stating that arbitration 
poses a challenge for developing countries due to the potentially high costs of conducting such 
procedures and the potential impact of awards on budgets and national reputations as location 
for investment.). 
56 Bjorklund, supra note 3, at 3-4. 
57 Franck, supra note 4, at 62.   
58 Id. at 49. 
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for the U.S. alone were nearly 3 million dollars.59  Additionally, in the situation of 
Argentina, arguably one of the largest defaults in history, the claims aggregated in 
the multi-billions.60  These claims not only direct needed public funds towards non-
public interests,61 but also any potential benefit that a developed country may have 
received from the additional FDI brought in by the BIT could be easily nullified by 
one large award.  This, therefore, makes a BIT essentially worthless. 
"[D]eveloping countries should be cautious about taking too uncritical an attitude 
toward the benefit of FDI . . . .  [T]ransfer of control may not always benefit the host 
country . . . ."62  As shown, BITs on their face may seem beneficial and almost 
necessary for developing countries, but in reality they simply allow FDI to take 
control of local markets without doing anything to help them improve and then sue 
when they are not getting their way. 
IV.  DELIBERALIZATION APPROACHES THAT CAN TURN INEFFECTIVE BITS INTO A 
CATALYST FOR ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT 
As it stands, BITs do not appear to help anyone other then the rich investor from 
the powerful developed countries, and the poor undeveloped countries are left on the 
periphery.  However, BITs do not need to be simply accepted “as-is,” nor do they 
need to be scrapped completely.  By taking an interventionist's approach of 
implementing a few deliberalizing regulations as well as supporting and promoting 
the trend of added transparency within the investor-state arbitration proceedings, 
developing countries can use BITs to not only influence and protect FDI, but to 
stabilize and develop their sovereign economies.   
The remainder of this paper will first acknowledge the issue of collective action 
that naturally rises from the idea of countries deliberalizing without scaring off 
foreign investments or shifting their share to another more liberalized developing 
economy.63   This will be followed by a presentation of some of the regulations and 
actions the developing countries should implement and how they will benefit these 
countries. 
A.  The Problem of Collective Action 
The suggestions being made below will, continuously, have the issue of 
collective action looming over it like a black cloud.  This collective action problem 
will stem from the fact that the suggestions to be made will be thought to potentially 
hinder FDI flow into the developing country.  More so, developing countries will be 
                                                                 
59 Bjorklund, supra note 3, at 3-4. 
60 Franck, supra note 4, at 49. 
61 Andrea J. Menaker, Benefiting from Experience: Developments in the United States' 
Most Recent Investment Agreements, 12 U.C. DAVIS J. INT'L L. & POL'Y 121, 124 (2005) 
("[A]ny award [or fee] in favor of the investor will be paid out of the public fisc . . . ."). 
62 Prakash Loungani & Assaf Razin, How Beneficial is Foreign Direct Investment for 
Developing Countries?, 38 FIN. & DEV. (June 2001), available at http://www.imf.org/ 
external/pubs/ft/fandd/2001/06/loungani.htm. 
63 As will be shown, the problem of collective action will arise due to the attempt of some 
developing countries to not de-liberalize and thereby attract an uneven share of the FDI, even 
though, as shown above, this share of FDI will continue to hurt the countries’ economies.  
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weary of deliberalizing, even slightly, due to the fear that other developing countries 
will "cheat" by offering foreign investors more extensive liberal protections, even at 
their own harm, in order to get a larger share of the available FDI.64    
Although the problem of collective action is an issue that could not be covered or 
solved in an entire case book, rather than one paper, it should be stated that at the 
present time the ability for developing countries to implement the suggestions below 
is ideal due to the weakened global economy.  The weakened global economy 
provides a prime opportunity for deliberalization because the risk of losing initial 
FDI is minimal since there has been a significant decrease in obtainable FDI, 
anyway.65  Specifically, after hitting a record $1.8 trillion in 2007, FDI flows 
decreased drastically in 2008 and 2009 with a slowed but continued decline in 
2010.66  As stated by UNCTAD,“[the present financial crisis] could lead to major 
structural changes in the world economy.”67  So why can't these structural changes 
benefit the developing world as well as the developed one? It does not always have 
to be a one-sided gain. 
Furthermore, although it is argued that deliberalizing will hinder potential FDI,68 
if the regulations are customary and consistent throughout the developing markets, 
then the FDI flow will not be discouraged because there will not be any more 
drastically liberal markets available to it in the developing world.  Since FDI will 
still need to seek markets present in these developing economies, it will have to 
adhere to those regulations.   
Finally, as an aside, common sense should be noted that if the developing 
markets prosper and grow, then larger markets will be available for the developed 
countries’ FDI.  This would allow FDI to prosper in spite of the de-liberalized 
regulations.  As a result, if developing countries can universally apply some of the 




                                                                 
64 Vandevelde, supra note 1, at 485 (stating that interventionist measures may risk 
discouraging desirable FDI); Yackee, supra note 7, at 197 (“[D]eveloping countries also face 
individual incentives to ‘cheat’ by offering foreign investors more extensive protections, in 
order to capture outsized portions of available investment.”). Although it is argued that de-
liberalizing will hinder potential FDI, consistent regulations throughout the markets of 
developing economies will actually force FDIs to continue investing in them, because there 
will be no "more liberal" market available to it and the FDI will still need to seek markets 
present in these developing economies. 
65 See UNCTAD, Assessing the Impact of the Current Financial and Economic Crisis on 
Global FDI Flows (Feb. 4, 2009), http://www.unctad.org/Templates/Page.asp?intItemID= 
4712&lang=1.  Furthermore, this view of risk has caused many companies to drastically 
curtail their investment portfolios. See id. 
66 See id.; Michael Gestrin, International Investment Limps into 2011, OECD Investment 
News, Issue 14 (Nov. 2010), available at http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/13/60/46419425.pdf 
(stating that after significant declines in 2008 and 2009, “international investment remain[ed] 
flat” at the end of 2010”). 
67 UNCTAD, supra note 65. 
68 See Vandevelde, supra note 1, at 485. 
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B.  Suggestions for Deliberalized Regulations 
The suggested deliberalizing actions are based off of the interventionist model of 
BIT regulations.  This model calls for "state regulation of foreign investment to 
ensure that the investment has the desired consequences."69  This is opposed to the 
currently used Liberal Model, which calls for “free flow of capital” 70 and has led to 
some of the problems listed above (e.g. the exodus of "hot money" at the slightest 
scare).  Such interventionist actions include the (1) instating of performance-based 
requirements, (2) the prohibition of undesirable FDI, (3) the imposition of exchange 
controls, (4) the promotion of portfolio investment, and (5) textual clarification of 
BIT treaty provisions. 
1.  Performance-Based Requirements 
Performance-based requirements are probably the most powerful regulation 
method that developing countries do not use.71  This stems from the fact that the 
United States Model BIT, the most widely followed model, promotes substantial 
liberalization by prohibiting the imposition of performance requirements on 
investments.72  However, these can be the strongest means of controlling what FDIs 
come in, how it comes in, and what they do when it gets in.  Some particularly 
beneficial regulations would be to require FDIs to: (1) maintain partial domestic 
ownership or joint ventures with locals as opposed to subsidiaries to the parent 
corporation; (2) hire locally; (3) provide advanced job training to locals; (4) use 
locally produced inputs; and (5) provide technology transfers or limitations on 
technology-licensing fees.73 
The maintenance of partial domestic ownership or pursuing joint ventures as 
opposed to exclusively foreign-run subsidiaries would allow for the creation of local 
jobs, provide a domestic influence in the investment’s performance that would help 
the FDI to maintain a relationship with the developing country's culture, and create a 
push for purchasing locally produced goods as opposed to imported goods from the 
parent.74  This would provide a direct flow of capital to the domestic markets, as well 
as grant employment to locals, thereby increasing the income per capita. 
The requirement to hire locally and to provide advanced job training to locals can 
increase the sophistication of local employees, which they could thereby pass to 
other locals and create a more sophisticated employee pool for outside or domestic 
                                                                 
69 Id. at 478. 
70 Id. 
71 By definition, performance requirements are the “direct regulation of foreign 
investment” by the host government. Id. at 495. 
72 Ginsburg, supra note 5, at 109.  The United States’ prohibition on performance 
requirements makes perfect sense because, without performance requirements, investors can 
exploit the markets, obtain quick capital, and leave without consequences, being fully 
protected.  
73 These performance regulations are not exhaustive and many other types can and should 
be considered while determining specific needs of individual states.  
74 Vandevelde, supra note 1, at 486. 
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employers.75  Furthermore, this increased sophistication could lead to some 
employees opening up ventures of their own, and in doing so, create new domestic 
markets.76  All of this, including the mere increase in employment, allows for more 
capital already present in the market to flow to the domestic economy as opposed to 
the parent corporation as well as allow for new markets to bring in capital not 
already coming into the developing country. 
The requirement to use locally produced inputs, when available, will ensure that 
FDIs do not merely ship goods that they get from their parent overseas merely 
because they may be cheaper, due to increased resource availability and greater 
production efficiency in the parent’s more mature market.  These local input 
requirements will, just like the other suggested requirements, ensure that capital stays 
local and does not export back to the home country77 because foreign investors will 
have to purchase their needed resources from local markets or produce the goods 
locally, which would force capital to be input into the developing market. 
A developing country should require technology transfers or limitations to 
technology-licensing fees.78  This helps to produce new markets, increase the 
sophistication within present markets, and increase efficiency and production within 
new or current domestic markets79 because it would allow for the developing country 
to use, acquire, produce, and adapt the sophisticated foreign technology the FDIs 
expose it to without having to expend large amounts of non-existent time and money 
on research and development. 
2.  Prohibition of Undesirable FDI 
A developing country should retain the right to prohibit undesirable FDI from 
coming into its market.  This would allow for more control over what sections of the 
market FDI can become a part of.  Such market areas that may want to protect are 
ones that have cultural importance, affect the military sector, or are relatively new 
sectors that are especially susceptible to exploitation or corruption.80 
3.  Exchange Controls 
Exchange controls should be put in place to prevent foreign investors from 
transferring returns on investments out of the host state as well as prevent "hot 
money" from drastically fleeing the country at the slightest sign of social, political, 
                                                                 
75 See id. at 479-80. 
76 See id. 
77 The constant push to increase domestic capital follows from recognition that it is a 
leading factor in enhancement of domestic production.  See id. at 479.  For example, it has 
been assessed that growth in capital represents fifty to ninety percent of fiscal development in 
the economies of non-Western countries.  Id.  
78 See Vandevelde, supra note 1, at 485.  Technology transfers are typically not placed in 
BIT agreements because FDIs do not trust the security or quality control of their technology 
with anyone other than themselves. See id. at 475. 
79 See id. at 480. 
80 See id. at 484. 
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or economic downturn.81  This would help provide economic stability as a whole and 
would ensure that FDI would be more grounded and less speculative in regards to the 
desired return. 
4.  Portfolio Investments 
Developing countries should promote portfolio investment as opposed to 
traditional FDI.  Portfolio investment is the investment in existing domestic entities, 
similar to the way a person would invest in a company's stock.82  Portfolio 
investment provides a solid return on investments for foreign investors without these 
same investors having control over a domestic company.83  Furthermore, this helps 
investors reduce risk because they can geographically diversify their investments by 
investing in multiple companies that are located in different regions or invest in one 
company that has subsidiaries in multiple regions.84  This will decrease a developing 
country’s risk of total FDI withdrawal. When an economic downturn occurs in a 
specific region and an investor gets nervous and chooses to flee, it may only pull 
money out of the specific region and not the entire country. 
5.  Textual Clarifications and Definitions 
The textual provisions in the BITs need to be better clarified.  This clarification 
will help provide developing countries with predictability as to potential BIT 
violations when they are exercising their sovereign and regulatory powers.85  
Clarifications would provide a high degree of predictability if the textual contractors 
followed the legislative approach.86  This approach focuses on the changing of treaty 
text to provide greater clarity about the content and scope of particular investment 
rights, typically through the recommendation that detailed definitions be provided in 
regards to treaty terms.87 
Since almost all BITs have fairly uniform rights, the definitions and textual 
specificity will provide greater predictability universally.88  This has already begun 
to occur within the United States Model BITs.89  In 2004, the United States modified 
its Model BIT to clarify the standards, "National Treatment," "Minimum Standard of 
Treatment," and "Expropriation."90  "National Treatment" can now have policy 
                                                                 
81 See id. at 484-85 (referring to the prevention of capital flight); Ginsburg, supra note 5, 
at 112. 
82 See Vandevelde, supra note 1, at 476. 
83 Id. 
84 Id. 
85 See Franck, supra note 4, at 57-58. 
86 See id. at 84-85. 
87 See id. at 84. 
88 See id. at 86. 
89 Meg Kinnear & Robin Hansen, The Influence of NAFTA Chapter 11 in the BIT 
Landscape, 12 U.C. DAVIS J. INT'L L. & POL'Y 101, 113-14 (2005). 
90 See Menaker, supra note 61, at 121-24.  This clarification is a result of the many 
arbitration proceedings brought against the United State pursuant to NAFTA Chapter 11, 
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consideration included when developing the scope of its application.91  "Minimum 
Standard of Treatment" now incorporates customary international law on the 
minimum standard of treatment into its definition.92  Additionally, "Expropriation" 
can now be interpreted in congruence with customary international law and further 
requires that there be a taking of property or interest in property.93  However, 
provisions such as "Investment," "Fair and Equitable Treatment," etc., have yet to be 
defined in the same manner and therefore more textual clarification is necessary to 
ensure a high level of predictability.94 
C.  Suggestions for Arbitration Rules 
Investor-state dispute resolution claims have been growing in number 
dramatically over the past few years, and, therefore, a body of law is starting to 
originate to help formulate the boundaries of BIT provisions and protections.95  
However, as shown above, these arbitration rulings are inconsistent and 
unpredictable, thereby failing to provide the necessary precedent used to help 
evaluate scope and application of BIT provisions, as well as unfairly benefiting the 
investor.96  The unpredictability leads to unfair and arbitrary results, hinders the 
formulation of a necessary body of law, and creates inefficient and lengthier rulings.  
This, in turn, can result in increased administrative and legal fees and can place 
developing countries at risk of suffering huge financial losses resulting from a 
violation they were not aware of committing.97  Many of these problems can be 
solved through (1) the promotion of the current trend of increased transparency, (2) 
the providing of quality legal assistance to parties to an investor-state dispute, and 
(3) the promotion of the parallel use of conciliation.98 
                                                          
which regulates investments.  The United States pursued more clarified definitions that 
derived from NAFTA case law to help keep its potential for liability predictable. Id. at 121, 
123-24.   The United States, in turn, applied these clarifications to BITs so it can have the 
same predictability throughout the globe. Kinnear & Hansen, supra note 89, at 115. 
91 Kinnear & Hansen, supra note 89, at 113. 
92 Id. at 114 (this definition was a result of Loewen Group, Inc. (Can.) v. United States); 
Menaker, supra note 61, at 123. 
93 Kinnear & Hansen, supra note 89, at 114; Menaker, supra note 61, at 124.  Although the 
scope and application of Expropriation has not changed, the United State made the changes to 
the text of the provision to provide more clarity. Id. 
94 Brand, supra note 27; Dr. Stephen W. Schill, Ioana Tudor: The Fair and Equitable 
Treatment Standard in the International Law of Foreign Investment, 20 EUR. J. INT’L L. 236, 
236 (2009) (book review). 
95 Bjorklund, supra note 3, at 1; Parra, supra note 19, at 43 (by the end of 1996, only 9 
cases had been decided by the arbitration proceedings; however, in the three years following 
that, over 30 cases had been brought before tribunals); UNCTAD, supra note 55 (by the end of 
2005, approximately 230 investor-State claims had been brought before arbitration tribunals). 
96 See Text and Authority, supra Part II. 
97 See Text and Authority, supra Part II. 
98 This list is meant to be illustrative of some main methods of improving BIT arbitration 
proceedings; however, it is not exhaustive. 
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1.  Promotion of Current Trend to Increase Transparency in Arbitration  
Proceedings 
Traditionally, investor-state arbitrations conducted under BIT provisions were 
secret matters where little to no disclosure of documents, awards, or decisions 
occurred.99  However, "[o]ne of the more remarkable trends evident in recent years 
has been the appreciable increase in process transparency and public scrutiny 
associated with investor-state arbitration . . . ."100  Decisions are now being released 
to the public and becoming subjected to more and more critique and skeptical 
scrutiny.101   
This trend led the ICSID, on April 10th, 2006, to amend its rules to provide for 
more transparency of its arbitrations.102  These rules allowed for the submission and 
acceptance of amicus curiae briefs, subject to certain conditions, and made the public 
disclosure of awards mandatory.103  This trend is exceptionally beneficial to 
developing countries because "greater public attention is likely to lead to decisions of 
better quality as arbitrators are required to explain clearly their reasons for coming to 
conclusions," and this greater quality of decisions will lead to more developed law, 
which reciprocally means more predictable and consistent law.104  Thus, developing 
countries need to ensure that the transparency requirements are listed in the BIT, 
either through requiring ICSID to govern ADR or, if another tribunal system 
governs, requiring the transparency laws listed in the ICSID to be expressly stated in 
the dispute resolution provisions. 
2.  Legal Assistance 
Another method of improving the arbitration and its results is to have an even 
playing field before the arbitration even begins.  Having international organizations 
provide legal assistance or legal training in the areas of complex investment 
arbitrations can do this.105  This will allow developed countries to obtain legal 
assistance that is knowledgeable about BIT arbitrations and the body of law that 
                                                                 
99 Andrew de Lotbiniere McDougall & Ank Santens, ICSID Amends its Arbitration Rules, 
INT. A.L.R., 9(4), 119, 119 (2006). 
100 Coe, supra note 50, at 26-27. 
101 Bjorklund, supra note 3, at 1-2.  This distributional explosion of decisions has been 
facilitated by the Internet as well as the government's growing realization that these 
international tribunal's decisions "almost inevitably" affect the public. Id. 
102 McDougall & Santens, supra note 99.  This is in part a result of the increased 
transparency required for arbitration commencing under NAFTA Chapter 11, which spurred 
the United States and Canada to change their Model BIT provisions to increase transparency 
of arbitration proceedings. Kinnear & Hansen, supra note 89, at 110. 
103 Kinnear & Hansen, supra note 89, at 120-21. 
104 Bjorklund, supra note 3, at 3-4. 
105 Franck, supra note 4, at 93.  The idea that arbitrations were not on a "fair playing field" 
is in regard to the tactics engaged by investors in arbitration proceeding and these tactics as of 
late have been subject to a high level of scrutiny due to the higher degree of transparency 
allowing the pubic to observe and critique said tactics. See Bjorklund, supra note 3, at 4. 
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comes with it.106  Additionally, with the rapid increase in the number of investment 
claims being brought to arbitration, a qualified investment arbitrator will not only 
know how to conduct himself or herself during the arbitration, but will be aware of 
the trends in the law and will be able to stay up to date on arbitration decisions.107  
This will allow developing countries to have the same quality legal assistance as the 
investors, who have the time and the money to obtain similar quality legal 
assistance.108 
Additionally, this same organization should provide legal training in the areas of 
arbitration and investment treaties.109  This would allow for developing countries to 
eventually have their own pool of qualified lawyers to not only arbitrate on the state's 
behalf but to also negotiate future BITs or negotiate for necessary changes to the 
BIT's provisions similar to the ones stated above.  Therefore, legal assistance and 
legal training will not only help create a fair arbitration that will more than likely 
obtain the best decision, but will also provide developing countries with the 
knowhow to negotiate future BITs and BIT provisions in order to make them 
beneficial to both parties. 
3.  Parallel Conciliation 
The use of conciliation, alongside with, or parallel to, investor-state arbitration 
can help reduce cost, increase efficiency, maintain investor-state relationships, 
control caseloads, etc.110  Conciliation is basically "facilitated negotiation" that 
operates based on mutual agreement, collaboration, and cooperation.111   
This method is an ideal mate for BIT arbitration because it can "transform a legal 
dispute into a restructured relationship, enlarging the value of the relationship to each 
[party]."112  Conciliation helps to reduce cost not only by reducing legal fees and 
administrative fees but by providing potential decreased compensation amounts, 
since it is normal for settlements to be "cheaper" then judgments.113  It also helps to 
control the caseload of states being subject to multiple arbitrations at once since they 
                                                                 
106 Id. 
107 Id. See Bjorklund, supra note 3, at 1; Parra, supra note 19, at 43; UNCTAD, supra note 
55. NAFTA's Chapter 11 arbitrations are creating a relatively large body of international 
investment case law and these cases/arbitrations are significantly influencing non-NAFTA 
investment disputes and decisions. Kinnear & Hansen, supra note 89, at 101, 110, 115.  
108 Including the fact that investors will typically only be in one arbitration at a time, 
where as States can get caught up in multiple proceedings, which can cause a decreased 
amount attention and resources to be devoted to each. See Coe, supra note 50, at 22-23 
(stating that one way implementing conciliation can help is to control the caseloads of foreign 
sovereigns whom are facing multiple cases, thereby allowing a state to focus more energy and 
resources towards the cases that go to arbitration). 
109 Franck, supra note 4, at 93. 
110 See generally, Coe, supra note 50. 
111 Id. at 14-15.  Basically, it is a settlement mechanism because a dispute will not end on 
conciliation unless both parties agree to the resulting settlement. Id. at 15. 
112 Id. at 15.  
113 Id. at 33. 
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can designate some cases as being settlement prone and thus place more resources on 
the cases that are less likely to settle.114  Furthermore, conciliation will increase 
efficiency because it can help end cases before they go through the long process of 
arbitration and decrease the overall arbitration caseload at the same time. 
Therefore, with conciliation playing as a complement to BIT arbitration 
proceedings, developing countries can be provided with more options to end disputes 
quickly, accurately, and cost effectively. 
V.  CONCLUSION 
In conclusion, this paper has attempted to show that BITs are everywhere.  While 
the purpose of BITs is to facilitate FDI flows into foreign sovereigns, thereby 
improving that country's economy, what these BITs really do is provide FDIs with 
the ability to control the markets and economies of developing countries while 
simultaneously being fully protected from harm, whilst providing little to no benefit 
to these developing countries in return.  However, with this vast network of BITs, the 
idea of just nullifying them seems to be impossible.  Fortunately, the ending of all 
BITs is not necessary or even prudent.  All that needs to occur is for developing 
countries to slightly deliberalize their respective agreements through the 
implementation of certain regulations as well as promote and improve upon the 
current trends in arbitration protocol.  Furthermore, the problem of collective action 
can be beat due to the present global economic state, because a country's fear of 
losing potential FDI by deliberalizing their BIT agreements should be at a minimum 
since there is a decreased amount of potential FDI available (thereby making it less 
beneficial for other states to "cheat" to obtain a higher share of FDI). 
Developing countries can benefit from FDI so long as they work together to 
ensure that FDI helps their respective economies.  Further, deliberalizing all present 
BITs to ensure that there is mutual benefit for both investors and states, rather than a 
unilateral inventor benefit, can do this. 
 
                                                                 
114 Id. at 22-23, 33.  
